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ABSTRACT
This study examined the North Dakota legislature's 
committee system in the 1991 session. Specifically, the study 
evaluated the influence and efficacy of North Dakota's commit­
tee system according to criteria offered by the state legisla­
tive scholar Alan Rosenthal. Individual features and proce­
dures of North Dakota's legislature have been evaluated 
according to how well they contribute to, or detract from, an 
efficiently operating legislature.
This study also examined the degree to which the full 
floor supported its committees' recommendation once the bills 
came up for final floor work. It was hypothesized that commit­
tees in states serve as important predictors of voting 
behavior on the full floor (as is the case in Congress). This 
is measured by examining the percentage of congruence between 
committee recommendations and floor action. Whether, and to 
what extent, this is actually the case is addressed.
The House and Senate have been ill be compared in terms 
of success rates of committee recommendations and variables 
hypothesized to affect success rates will be examined. Other 
factors, shown to distinguish between powerful and weak 
committee systems have been examined as well. These include: 
1) the ability and willingness of committees to shape legisla-
viii
tion, 2) the ability of committees to screen legislation, 3) 
the role of committees in formulating legislation, and 4) the 
extent to which the floor accepts the recommendations made in 
committee.
Several factors thought to influence the success of 
committees have been tested to determine whether any rela­
tionship exists. These factors can be broadly identified as 
seniority of chair and expertise of committee members. 
Inferential statistics are used to determine if a relationship 
exists and its strength.
Generally, the results show that the North Dakota 
legislature shows a great deal of deference to its commit­
tees' recommendations (93% of recommendations were accepted on 
the floor). There appears be little relation between any of 
the variables studied and committee success rates in the North 
Dakota legislature. The variables studied were: tenure of 
chair, returning chair or new chair, average tenure of 




A noted scholar of state committee systems once said:
As an army marches on its stomach, so a legislature 
stands on its committees. Standing committees are the 
legislative agencies during the session, and a variety 
of groups - standing, special and joint committees as 
well as commissions - are the primary legislative 
agencies between sessions during the interim period. 
These are the basic work groups of the legislature. It 
is in committees that bills are reviewed, citizens 
are heard, budgets are examined, appropriations are 
determined, policies are explored, programs and 
agencies are assessed, and executive nominations are 
screened, It is in committee where disagreements first 
emerge and efforts can be made to resolve them. One 
legislative leader went as far as to exclaim: 'Any 
state legislature you want to mention could not 
possibly work without a strong and well-organized 
committee system.... If the committee system doesn't 
work, I don't care what you do, you can't make the 
legislature work'.1
This statement from Alan Rosenthal is indicative of the 
prevailing belief among scholars focusing their research on 
legislative bodies and, specifically, committee functioning in 
a legislative environment.2 With the importance of committees 
to the legislative process universally recognized, this study
1Rosenthal, Alan, Legislative Life (New York, NY: Harper and 
Row, 1981), p. 181.
2Wayne Francis, "Leadership, Party Caucuses, and Committees 
in U.S. State Legislatures," Legislative Studies Quarterly X ,
(2 May 1985), p.243.
John H. Culver and John C. Syer, Power and Politics in 
California. (New York: MacMillian Publishing Co., 1988), 
p.167.
John D. Lees and Malcolm Shaw, Committees in Legislatures, 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1979), p.3.
1
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will attempt to examine committee importance within the North 
Dakota legislative process.
Any study of state committee systems must give much 
credit to the work of Alan Rosenthal who has done valuable 
work in the field. This study will draw heavily from his work. 
Unfortunately, there does not exist much in the way of 
existing research done in the field of state committee sys­
tems. Most work in the area of committee power and roles deals 
with Congress. The author's work as a legislative intern in 
the North Dakota state legislature during the 1991 session 
allowed him to observe just how much influence is exerted by 
committees in the passage of legislation. This work is an 
attempt systematically to address that observation and to add 
to the body of literature on committee systems in state 
legislatures.
Legislators and people who attempt to influence legis­
lation - state agency employees, lobbyists, concerned citizens 
- as well as academicians who study law-making in states, need 
to understand where important decisions are made. They all 
need to appreciate the dynamics at work and the forces at 
issue. Legislators - indeed anyone who attempts to influence 
policy-making - in order to function effectively, must 
understand the importance of committees in making decisions. 
It is the purpose of this study to show this importance. Other 
individuals also have an interest in obtaining knowledge as to 
the exercise of political power - defined here as the ability
3
to get the results they seek. Sidney Verba said it very well,
The bulk of significant political decisions . . . are 
made neither by individual, autonomous decision-makers 
... nor by all the members of the political system, by 
the electorate, or by the rank and file of a political 
party. It is to the face-to-face group that one must 
look if one is to find the locus of decision-making in 
political systems.3
Since most committees are small, select groups, this statement
applies to the workings of committees. Thomas Dye also
recognizes the importance of committees:
(M)any observers and legislators feel that committee 
work is essential to the legislative process. It is 
here that public hearings are held, policies pleaded 
and debated, legislation amended and compromised, bills 
rushed to the floor or pigeonholed. The committee 
hearing is generally the most important source of 
information for legislators, and lobbyists tend to 
flock to the committee rooms as the focal point of 
their contact with legislators.4
If all this has a Machiavellian tone to it, this is 
inherent in the study of politics. Legislation involves the 
push\pull of lawmaking; scholars must endeavor to observe the 
facts and discuss the locus where power is exercised. Legisla­
tors and scholars both believe it to be in the committee rooms 
of the legislative assembly.
Lees and Shaw recognize that it is in small groups 
(committees) and through face-to-face interaction that most 
deliberation takes place, compromises arrived at, and deci­
3S. Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior, p. 19 as 
quoted in John D. Lees and Malcolm Shaw eds. , Committees in 
Legislatures, (Durham, NC:Duke University Press, 1979), p.3.
4Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities. (Engle­
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985), p. 155-56.
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sions ultimately made5. The intent of this work is to build 
upon this consensus and address the North Dakota legislature 
and its committees specifically.
Statement of Hypotheses
Research issue: because North Dakota is a rural state, with a 
part-time legislature and no professional staff for individual 
legislators or committees, the positive or negative recommen­
dations of committees will be substantially reflected in the 
floor votes of the legislature. This study will examine the 
extent to which what Keefe and Ogul said about committees is 
true: " (C) ommittees do more than advise and recommend to their 
parent chamber, ... their decisions tend to be the eventual 
decisions of the body itself."6
Hypothesis 1: In the North Dakota legislature, committee 
recommendations are accepted at a substantial rate, 
here defined as 75% of the time.
Hypothesis 2: The Senate in North Dakota will be less
deferential to the recommendations of its committees 
than the House.
Hypothesis 3: Seniority of committee members will have a 
positive affect on the success rate of committee 
recommendations. Committees having a higher average
5Ibid. p. 4
6William J. Keefe and Morris S, Ogul as quoted in Alan 
Rosenthal, Legislative Performance in the States. (New York, 
NY: The Free Press, 1974) p.28.
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seniority of its members should have more success 
getting recommendations accepted.
Hypothesis 4: North Dakota legislative committees amend a 
high proportion of bills compared to other states and 
are successful in getting the full body to accept these 
amendments.
Hypothesis 5: The North Dakota legislative committee system 
is a strong one according to criteria established by 
Alan Rosenthal (which will be explained later).
Hypothesis 6: The tenure of the committee chairperson of 
will show a positive correlation with the percent of 
committee recommendations accepted by the full body.
Hypothesis 7: Committee recommendations on interim bills 
developed by the Legislative Council will have a higher 
success rate than bills introduced by individual 
legislators.
Hypothesis 8: Committees, when acting on bills passed over 
from the other house, will amend fewer bills than when 
they act as the house of first review of legislation. 
Bills should have the idiosyncracies worked out by the 
first house.
Literature Review
Committees, the "Little Legislatures"
The importance of committees has been speculated upon by 
students and scholars dating back to Woodrow Wilson's classic
6
Congressional Government in which he said:
(T)he privileges of the Standing Committees are the 
beginning and the end of the rules. Both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate conduct their business 
by what may figuratively, but not inaccurately, be 
called an odd device of disintegration. The House 
virtually both deliberates and legislates in small 
sections. ... In form, the Committees only digest the 
various matter introduced be individual members, and 
prepare it, with care, and after thorough investiga­
tion, for the final consideration and action of the 
House; in reality, they dictate the course to be 
taken, prescribing the decisions of the House not only, 
but measuring out, according to their own wills, its 
opportunities for debate and deliberation as well. 
...Congress in its committee rooms is Congress at 
work.7
Wilson was referring to the committee system of the 
national government, but states have shown similar tendencies 
toward committee government.
From review of existing literature, two possible expla­
nations account for the increasing importance of committees in 
legislating - one is the heavy workload encountered by 
legislatures and the second is the increasingly complex and 
technical subject matter of many of the bills introduced in 
legislative sessions.
Dye observed that the function of committees is to reduce 
legislative workload to manageable proportions by providing a 
division of labor within the system. This division of labor 
provides for some measure of specialization for committee 
members. He also noted that this division of labor, by design
7Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston, MA: 
Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1894), p. 62, 68-69
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or by default, enables committees to exert considerable 
influence over legislation.8
North Dakota's legislature, which meets biennially for a 
maximum of 80 days, must deal with a volume of bills and 
resolutions which would paralyze it if all testimony and 
deliberation were conducted on the floor of the respective 
houses. Table 1 shows bill totals of selected years.
Table 1
Workload. of North Dakota Legislature
1975 1981 1985 1989
Bills introduced 1112 1116 1175 1216
Resolutions 197 184 201 168
Introduced
Total 1309 1300 1376 1384
Source: North Dakota Legislative Council, Summary of Bills 
and Resolutions Passed and Introduced
Thw data mark a trend toward an increasing number of 
bills with which the legislature must deal. With the legis­
lative workload large and increasing, the committees must 
serve their function of winnowing this workload by evaluating 
bills, sometimes giving a "do not pass" recommendation which 
is often equivalent to killing the bill. Table 2 shows that 





Workload of Selected State Legislatures*
Montana South Dakota**
1985 1989 1985 1989
Bills Introduced 1428 1268 1265 1458
Resolutions 115 90 69 13
Introduced
Total 1543 1358 1334 1471
*South Dakota and Montana were chosen because they are 
regional neighbors and because they represent both annual 
legislatures (South Dakota) and biennial legislatures (Mon­
tana) .
**The totals for South Dakota are taken from the year shown 
and the previous year to for comparison purposes.
Source: The Council of State Governments, The Book of the 
States Lexington KY, 1986 and 1990.
Committees also serve as information gathering centers 
for the legislature. The committee setting is much better 
suited for hearing testimony from witnesses than would be 
either house. Committees serve to enhance democracy in 
legislatures by hearing citizens' testimony. Through this 
avenue, individuals can find a way to express feelings on 
matters which pertain to them.9
The increasing complexity of legislation has further 
shown the need for effective committees. As noted by Dye, 
committee service allow legislators to develop expertise.
9Lloyd Omdahl, 1989-91 Governing North Dakota. (Bureau of 
Governmental Affairs: Grand Forks, ND, 1989), p.58-59.
9
Whether because legislators request appointments to committees 
which interest them or the extra time spent dealing with 
related matters allows it, committee members are often seen as 
experts on issues which come before them.10 Lees has noted 
that with the growth of a federal bureaucracy, in size and 
specialization, the Congress has turned to committees to exert 
control over agencies and to better regulate them.11 Culver 
and Syer have suggested that committee assignments allow for 
specialization in state legislatures as well.12 Understand­
ably, legislators believe that complex issues with which 
bureaucrats work every day require a familiarity with the 
issues which cannot be attained through casual contact. 
Committees place legislators who have some expertise about 
subjects on committees where they can deal with agency 
bureaucrats more equitably. Other research has corroborated 
with that of Lees.13 State bureaucracies have shown a similar 
proliferation in size.
10Wayne L. Francis, "Leadership, Party Caucuses, and Commit­
tees in U.S. State Legislatures", Legislative Studies 
Quarterly. X (2, May 1985), p.244.
nLees, p.14.
12Culver and Syer, p.167.
13Samuel C. Peterson as quoted in Virginia Gray, Herbert 
Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines, Politics in the American States. 
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1983), p.169. and 
Omdahl, p.59.
10
Although Lees is referring to the U.S. Congress here, the 
author's experience working with the North Dakota legislature 
supports Lees's observations. The agriculture committee of the 
North Dakota Senate handled many bills for which the Agricul­
ture Department provided the only testimony. Sometimes this 
was because the issue at hand involved administrative 
procedures of concern to few outside of the Agriculture 
Department. At other times it was because the issue involved 
technicalities which seemed unimportant to the layman. In 
these cases, the expertise of the committee members provided 
them with the background to ask pertinent questions. The 
public, and legislators, both have an inherent suspicion of 
large government and bureaucratic growth, and the ability of 
committees to apply some measure of expertise helps to allay 
this fear.
There are two qualities which are closely associated with 
legislative expertise: stable committee membership and 
legislative staff. Rosenthal, in his study of four states - 
Tennessee, California, New Jersey, and Ohio - found a 
relationship between tenure and expertise. Members of the 
legislatures studied regarded those with more tenure as more 
expert in their fields. Perception of expertise continued to 
rise with number of years served. Fifty-four percent of 
legislators with ten or more years of experience were regarded 
as experts. This perception of expertise associated with 
tenure will be tested later.
11
A high turnover rate in a legislature has a debilitating 
effect on the perceived effectiveness of that body and its 
committee systems by legislators. If members do not serve on 
a committee long enough to firmly grasp the subject matter 
with which it deals, no sense of confidence in the recommenda­
tion of the committee is nurtured. High turnover rates 
"undermine committee influence, for groups composed of 
amateurs are not apt to carry much weight in legislative 
deliberations. 1,14
Another important source of expertise for legislators is 
the existence of professional staff. Rosenthal has found that 
this is an area where legislators generally felt that they 
were in need of more support in order to perform their duties 
more effectively.14 5 Legislative staff can act as the "eyes 
and ears" of legislators. Staff can aid in oversight of 
executive agencies keeping lawmakers abreast of develop­
ments which they themselves would not - or could not for time 
and resource constraints - be aware.
The amount of staff available to legislators varies 
widely from state to state. In the early 70's, Rosenthal found 
that nearly all legislatures were understaffed.16 Later 
research by Peterson has found that states have begun to put
14Alan Rosenthal, Legislative Performance in the States. 
(New York, NY: The Free Press, 1974), p.169-70.
15Ibid. , p. 146 .
16 Ibid. , p. 147-48
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money toward helping their legislators function more produc­
tively by providing more staff.17
Role of Committees in Formulating Policies and Programs
Committees are central to a legislature formulating 
programs and policies. Rosenthal has identified five dimen­
sions for program formulation: the referral of legislation, 
the screening of legislation, the shaping of legislation, the 
passage of legislation, and the study and development of 
legislation.18 This study will briefly describe each of these 
dimensions of policy and program formulation and will evaluate 
North Dakota's committee system's performance of these tasks.
It should be noted at the onset that in North Dakota, all 
bills introduced, unless withdrawn by the sponsor, must be 
voted upon in the chamber in which they were introduced. Bills 
cannot be pigeon-holed in committees or die of inactivity on 
the floor.19
The referral of legislation involves the extent to which 
committees receive legislation. In the states, not all 
legislation must be referred to committee, as is the case in 
the Congress. States have the right to by-pass the committee 
system altogether if they so desire. Rosenthal asserts that
17Samuel Peterson as Quoted in Gray, Virginia, Jacob, Her­
bert, and Vines, Kenneth N., Politics in the American States 
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1983), p.168-69.
18Rosenthal, 1974, pp. 18-35
19Rosenthal 1981, p.196.
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this practice effectively serves to undermine the committee 
system. In a number of states, major administrative proposals 
are moved directly to the floor without facing the risk of 
committee intervention. According to Rosenthal, a committee 
system's strength is related to the number of bills which are 
directed to it. The greater percentage of bills over which it 
has some control, the stronger the committee.
A) Bill Referral
The North Dakota legislature, with few exceptions, 
assigns all bills to the appropriate committee.20 The as­
signment procedure takes place differently in the House and 
Senate. Technically, in the House, the speaker assigns bills 
to committees while in the Senate, that job is handled by the 
President. In practice though, assignment is done in consulta­
tion with the majority leadership in the respective houses. If 
bill referral is to be considered as important to an effective 
committee system, then, as practically all bills in North 
Dakota go to committee, North Dakota has an effective 
committee system. North Dakota has 11 standing committees in 
each house each addressing various issues. Information on the 
committees is presented in Table 3.
20In the 1989 and 1991 sessions, all bills introduced into 









Human Services and 
Veterans Affairs*





State and Federal Government
Transportation
Dakota Legislative System 













* denotes committees meeting on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednes­
day. The others meet on Thursday and Friday. Members serve on 
one three day committee and one two day committee except for 
Appropriations.
** Appropriations meets Monday through Friday its members 
serve only on one committee.
B) Screening Legislation
The second dimension of performance - screening legisl­
ation - relates to the amount of control a committee has over 
the fate of bills referred to it. Generally, state committees 
have less prerogative in exercising control over legislation 
referred to them than Congress. Most bills introduced in
15
Congress die in committee. Only about two-thirds of the states 
have the power to dispose of legislation in this manner. The 
power not to take up legislation referred to it makes a 
committee system more formidable.
Just as important as killing a bill in committee, 
according to Rosenthal, is the extent to which committees give 
unfavorable recommendations to bills. If a committee seldom 
gives a "do not pass" recommendation to a bill, the screening 
function of the committee is lost. Rosenthal equates a 
perfunctory favorable recommendation from committees with a 
committee system which works less well than one that gives out 
meaningful "do not pass"es.
The ability of a committee to screen bills reflects a 
dimension of that committee system's power. If it is able to 
kill bills in committee, the committee has a great amount of 
power. However, about one third of the states do not grant 
committees this power and committees have to report out all 
bills referred to them. Such is the case in North Dakota where 
all bills have to be reported out of committee, to be voted 
upon on the floor unless withdrawn by the sponsor.
If committees cannot kill bills, they have other options 
for screening bills. Rosenthal notes that in committees which 
do not have the power to pigeonhole bills, one can look at the 
percentage of bills which receive favorable recommendation to 
determine if the committees are doing their job of screening
16
legislation. Table 4 shows this information for the 1991 North 
Dakota legislative session.
Table 4
Percentage of bills 
1991 Session.
receiving "do not pass" recommendations
Total bills 
referred*









TOTALS 1952 323 16.5
* The total number includes bills from both houses, i.e. House 
committees recommendations on House bills and Senate bills. 
** This reflects bills receiving "do not pass" and "do not 
pass as amended" recommendations.
Source: Committee intern reports compiled by the legislative 
council staff.
One can compare North Dakota's legislature with selected 
state legislatures in Table 5. In comparison with the 
legislatures presented, North Dakota's committees are very 
frugal in issuing negative recommendations. According to the 
data, then, North Dakota's committees do not function very 




Committee screening of bills of selected states.*
Number of Percentage of
bills referred favorable committee





New Jersey 1620 45
North Dakota 1934** 80
Source: Rosenthal, 1974, p.23.
* The data for Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi, 
and New Jersey are taken from 1969 legislative sessions of the 
respective legislatures. North Dakota's refers to the 1991 
session.
** This includes both houses' recommendations on its and the 
other houses bills. Thus the totals are larger than either 
houses total of bills introduced.
Performance also involves the ability of committees to 
shape the nature of legislation referred to them. This 
includes the ability of committees to amend bills. Aside from 
the favorable or unfavorable recommendation which committees 
give out to bills, an effective committee system has the power 
to effect its suggestions on legislation before it. The extent 
to which committees shape legislation can be measured by 
examining the total number of bills which emerge from 
committee with some form of change.
18
C) Shaping Legislation
A committee system can affect legislation in ways other 
than killing bills or recommending "do not pass". Committees 
can amend bills, changing substantially the legislation or 
technically amending the bill to correct minor errors. 
Rosenthal suggested that amending legislation is another 
dimension to be considered when evaluating committee systems, 
in general "a committee system performs less well if it makes 
changes in proportionately few of the bills it proposes for 
passage on the floor."21
Table 6
North Dakota committee modification of bills - 1991 session
Total # of # of bills %
bills referred amended
HOUSE 974 371 38.0
COMMITTEES
SENATE 978 346 35.3
COMMITTEES
TOTALS 1952 717 36.7
Results of amended bills for the 1991 legislative session 
in Table 6 show that North Dakota's committees amend a high 
percentage of bills. Comparisons with other states are shown 
in Table 7 and shows that North Dakota committees amend a 
relatively high percentage of bills. With 38.8% of bills
21Rosenthal, 1974, p.28.
19
coming out of committee with some form of amendment, North 
Dakota ranks behind only Florida in terms of percentages of 
bills amended, this is consistent with what Rosenthal has 
called an effective committee system.
Table 7
Selected states modification of bills*
Number of bills Percentage of
STATE favorably reported favorably reported











* Data for Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi and New 
Jersey are taken from the 1969 sessions while North Dakota's 
is from the 1991 session.
Source: Rosenthal, 1974, p.27
D) The Passage of Legislation
The fourth dimension of committee performance Rosenthal 
identifies relates to the extent to which committees recom­
mendations influence floor decisions. In Congress, this only 
pertains to the extent to which bills coming out of committee
20
pass on the floor, since bills not favored by the committee 
will not be sent to the floor. But in about one-third of the 
states - North Dakota included - all bills referred to 
committee have to be reported out either favorably or 
unfavorably. In states such as this then, one must look not at 
the number of bills which pass on the floor, but the percent­
age of committee recommendations which are accepted by the 
parent body.
States vary widely in how much deference is accorded to 
the recommendations of committees. Part of this variation can 
be ascribed to the role the members believe committees should 
take. For example, in the Illinois House, the committees act 
as a rubber stamp for most legislation which comes through 
their committees. It should come as no surprise, therefore, 
that almost half of all bills are defeated on the floor 
against the recommendation of their committees.
On the other hand, Ohio and Oregon represent opposite 
examples of floor deference to committee decisions. In Ohio 
during the 1969 and 1971-72 sessions, about 85% of bills 
coming out of its committees were enacted. Oregon saw only 
about two percent of recommendations coming out of committees 
not accepted by the full House or Senate.22
Another aspect of floor action on a committee recommen­
dation is whether or not the floor amends the committee 
version of the bill. Such action could be a rejection of
22Ibid. , p . 30
21
committee recommendation, depending on the nature of the 
amendment.
Rosenthal posits that "a committee performs less well if 
a number of its bills are prevented from being considered or 
if its bills are frequently rejected or amended on the 
floor. 1,23
E) Problem Study and Development of Legislation
The fifth dimension of committee performance Rosenthal 
identifies is that of problem study and legislation develop­
ment. The previous four dimensions pertained to committee 
activity during the session itself. However, in many states, 
the session is only a small part of the legislative process. 
These states meet only part of the year and some, such as 
North Dakota, meet only every other year. In such a climate, 
committee performance needs to take into account not only what 
committees accomplish during the time they are actually in 
session, but what they do or accomplish in the interim. An 
essential component of effective standing committees is that 
they do not cease to function during the interim. In some 
form, the committees must continue to perform their duties 
whether it be in the in-depth study of problems or in the 
formulation of legislation for the next legislative session. 
Existing research on interim activity is dated (Rosenthal, 
1974) , but it seems to show a trend toward more productive use
23Ibid. , p. 31
22
of this time. An increasing number of states have begun to 
make use of their standing committees by having them function 
in some capacity during the interim. Formerly, interim 
activity had been the domain of a legislative council or 
legislator-citizen councils.
In addition to continuing to exist during the interim, 
committees must show some type of accomplishment during this 
time. The problem with this is what can be considered an 
"accomplishment". Rosenthal admits this is a problem, and 
suggests two criteria for evaluating interim activity. First, 
does the standing committee publish some account of its 
interim activity? Such a report will document committee 
findings on problems for which it has responsibility. Second, 
does the standing committee formulate substantive legislation? 
The introduction of legislation to the session and the success 
of its suggestions on floor votes can provide one with a 
measure of this dimension to an effective committee system.
Rosenthal considered what a committee does when not in 
session an important part of its functioning. It is during 
this time that a committee must perform its role of studying 
problems and developing legislation. In a state such as North 
Dakota, which only meets every other year, the interim 
functioning of standing committees is important to effective 
legislating.
During the session, committees spend most of their time 
in the active processing of bills proposed by agencies or
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individual legislators. There is little time for study of 
problems other than becoming familiar with legislation on the 
calendar. It is often day-by-day preparation with little time 
to focus on long-term investigation of problems. The exception 
to this would be in the committees where legislators have 
expertise in the area.
The North Dakota legislature continues to operate during 
the interim through the Legislative Council, which is made up 
of 15 legislators (five Senate members at large plus two floor 
leaders and six at large House members plus two floor leaders) 
and a full-time support staff. This staff consists of 
attorneys, accountants, and researchers who act as bill 
drafters, and budget analysts for the council members.24
The legislative council meets after each session and 
establishes committees, appoints members to them, and 
determines what each shall study. The issues for consideration 
are often determined during the session either by being 
written into a resolution or a bill or by the direction of the 
Legislative Council. Membership on interim committees is 
extended to almost all legislators of the previous session.
The interim committees are organized around subject areas 
similar to, but not exactly like, like those of the session 
itself. However, since the committees of the interim are not 
the same as those of the session, the membership of the
24The information on interim committees comes from docu­
ments put out by the North Dakota legislative council.
24
respective committees changes as well. Strictly speaking then, 
as North Dakota's standing committees cease to exist during 
the interim, they do not fulfill all the criteria of 
Rosenthal's model of effective functioning committees.
However, according to the second dimension of better 
performing committee systems - showing accomplishment - the 
North Dakota system fares well. The committees have specific 
duties which are published by the legislative council and open 
for anyone to see. Each committee is given a list of issues to 
study and is expected to give a report of their findings to 
the council by the end of the interim.
Interim committees can be evaluated according to 
criteria formulated by Rosenthal. They must put out something 
which shows the results of their research and makes recommen­
dations for policy alternatives. In North Dakota, the 
legislative council, and the interim committees which are part 
of it, formulate bills which are introduced in the next 
legislative session.
During the 1989 session, 80.5% of legislative council 
bills passed in some form while 64.3% of all other bills 
passed. The numbers for the 1991 session show 70.9% of 
legislative council bills passing while 63.1% of all other 
bills passed.
The high proportion of Legislative Council bills which 
are enacted into law speaks well for the interim work of the 
North Dakota legislature. This shows that the committee system
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in the North Dakota state legislature functions effectively 
during the interim using Rosenthal's model. There are a number 
of interim bills introduced into the legislative session; 
their success rate follows fairly closely the success rate of 
all bills coming out of committees.
Powers of State Committee Systems
Having examined some dimensions of committee performance, 
we will now examine the powers at the disposal of committees 
to enhance their ability to perform. Here too, Alan Rosenthal 
has provided a model which will be described then applied to 
the North Dakota legislature and its committees.25
Rosenthal's model posits that two influences will have an 
effect on the performance of committee systems. The first of 
these is an institutional capacity and the second influence is 
its institutional power. Rosenthal defines institutional 
capacity as the ability of a legislature to handle large 
numbers of bills. For a legislature to do this, its structures 
must be organized in a logical, rational manner. Rosenthal 
cites a rational division of labor, an equitable 
distribution of work, and adequate resources as components of 
institutional capacity.
25Much of the following is taken from Rosenthal's Legisla­
tive Performance in the States, 1974.
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A) Institutional Capacity
Often, formal and informal structures within the 
legislature serve to inhibit effective functioning of a 
committee system. Institutional capacity addresses some of 
these structures and determines their contribution or 
detraction from the committee system's functioning.
One dimension of institutional capacity is the number of 
committee memberships each member of the legislature is called 
upon to serve. The fewer number of committee assignments per 
legislator, the more stronger will be the committee system. In 
North Dakota, legislators serve on only two committees (one 
two-day committee and one three-day committee) unless he\she 
serves on the Appropriations committee which meets all five 
days of the week. In this sense, North Dakota has a structure 
which enhances committee effectiveness.
A rational division of labor is essential to proper 
functioning of any committee system. Bills dealing with 
matters of industry should go to the Industry, Business and 
Labor committee, bills of agriculture should be sent to the 
Agriculture committee, and so on. North Dakota's committee 
system is set up to address the broad issues with which the 
state will deal. Bill referrals are made on the basis of 
subject matter to the committee most closely dealing with that 
subject. In both houses, referral is made by the leadership.
North Dakota operates its legislature with a minimum of 
staff and auxiliary personnel. The committees operate with
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spartan resources notably in the way of staff. Each committee 
is allocated one intern whose duty it is to perform minor bill 
amendments and conduct legislative research, and one clerk 
whose duty it is to take notes of proceedings including all 
role call votes. Individual legislators do not have personal 
staff to do work for them. However the legislative council 
staff dedicates itself to doing research and answering 
questions brought before it during the session.
It can safely be said that the North Dakota legislature 
operates with a minimum of legislative staff. Scholars would 
view this as a detriment to effective legislative performance.
Another aspect of institutional capacity is that of 
relative balance in the number of bills referred to the 
committees. A balanced distribution of bill referrals would 
mean that committees could devote sufficient time to deliber­
ating each bill before it. Table 8 shows that bill referral 
seems to be fairly evenly distributed among the committees in 
the two North Dakota houses.
As would be expected, three-day committees tended to be 
referred more bills than two-day committees.26 One inequality 
can be seen in the Senate where the Judiciary committee 
was referred more than twice as many bills as the Education 
committee - both three-day committees (the percentages shown
26The 1991 session showed that in the House three-day com­
mittees handling 59% of all bills and two-day committees had 
41%. The numbers for the Senate were 57% for three-day 
committees and 43% for two-day committees.
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reflect only raw numbers of bills; no consideration is given 
to the type of bills - i.e. far-reaching, controversial bills
Table 8
Committee Workload in North Dakota the state legislature - number of 
bills sent to each committee -1989 and 1991 session.
Committee House Senate House Senate
Industry, Business, and Labor
179 129 122 105
Judiciary 163 151 148 173
State and Federal 
Government
146 148 110 93
Appropriations 140 124 130 131
Education 112 96 93 82
Finance and Taxation 95 89 91 104
Human Services 
and Veterans Affairs
89 89 121 95
Political Subdivisions 88 92 50 90
Transportation 86 72 87 82
Natural Resources 85 82 76 84
Agriculture 83 80 76 70
Source: Final committee reports 
* denotes three-day committee 
**denotes two-day committee
prepared by the legislative council staff
or minor, technical bills. The results should be read with 
this limitation in mind.).
Overall, the data show that North Dakota's legislature 




The second influence on legislative performance that 
Rosenthal posits is that of institutional power. Institutional 
power is defined as the "location of political power and how 
it is used" and refers to non-structural influences on the 
operation of the committees.27 The first of these influences 
which Rosenthal describes is the centralization of the 
appointment process. It is posited that the more centralized 
is the appointment process for members and chairpersons (i.e. 
appointment power in the hands of one party leader) the less 
powerful will be the committee system itself. This is because 
large turnover could occur with each change in party leader­
ship and the time needed to develop expertise will not be 
accorded to committee members.
The opposite of a leadership oriented appointment process 
described above would be one based on seniority whereby those 
with the longest tenure would have strong say over their 
committee assignment(s). A state with such a system could be 
said to have more institutional power in Rosenthal's model 
because the committee memberships can occur independent of the 
leadership.
Rosenthal posited that a decentralized procedure would 
promote the most effective system. Such a system would rely 
more on seniority and legislator preference which contributes 
to the development of specialization. If appointment is
27Alexander Heard as quoted in Rosenthal, 1974, p.55.
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centered in the hands of party leaders who are subject to 
change every session, members may be shuffled around with 
little attention to specialization.
North Dakota's method of committee appointment is a 
hybrid of the methods discussed above. In the Senate, a 
Committee on Committees is elected, with the majority leader 
acting as its chair. This committee makes appointments, giving 
considerable attention to the expressed preferences of the 
individual legislators (legislators rank the committees they 
prefer to serve in and these preferences are expressed in 
writing to the leadership during the organizational meeting of 
the legislature in December preceding the session).
Appointment in the House is in the hands of the Speaker 
of the House, again with attention being given the expressed 
desires of the individual legislators.
Formally, appointment to committees in North Dakota is in 
the hands of a few party leaders. Such a practice is not 
conducive to strong committee systems, according to 
Rosenthal. However, in practice the leaders make efforts to 
accommodate legislators' wishes (at least if the majority 
party leaders feel it will not hurt their power in a given 
committee). In sum, the appointment process is centralized 
with the majority leadership. Such a process presents the 
possibility for arbitrary action, but consideration for the 
preferences of individual legislators normally prevents this.
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Summary
Chapter one has presented some of the literature on 
committee systems in states - their powers, their functions - 
and presented some comparisons among states. Unfortunately, 
there has been little done in the way of committee systems in 
states and little of what has been done is current. What is 
available shows that committees function in states much as 
they do in Congress albeit with less power to dispense with 
proposed legislation in committee. Committees seem to be an 
pivotal arena of legislating and one that must be examined 
carefully by scholars attempting to describe the workings of 
any legislative system.
Rosenthal has shown that not all state committees 
function equally well. He established a model employed by this 
study to evaluate the North Dakota legislative committee 
system. According to Rosenthal's model, North Dakota has a 




As noted in chapter one, the literature search found few 
studies on state committees. As such, there were no models 
upon which to base the research design and no baseline data 
with which to compare the results. The committee system of 
Congress has long been the focus of scholarly interest while 
those of the respective states have received little attention. 
In the age of deregulation and of shifting responbilities (if 
not money) from the federal government to the states, it is 
particularly frustrating to find so little research done in 
the arena where many important decisions of the 1990's will be 
made.
This study will focus on the 1991 legislative session. 
Facts concerning the 1991 session - for example, partisan 
balance of the House and Senate, partisan balance of the 
committees, total bills, - are included in the appendix. This 
study will include, as its data base, all bills introduced in 
the 1991 Legislative Session. Only bills will be studied. The 
study will exclude resolutions and concurrent resolutions 
because these are usually not controversial and receive less 
critical scrutiny. The inclusion of all bills of one session, 
rather than sampling several sessions, provides a reliable
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data set. For the descriptive statistics - part one of chapter 
three - this data set is completely reliable and provides 
accurate results. For the inferential statistics, using only 
one session's bills causes problems of how readily the results 
can be generalized. However, it was felt that a complete set 
from one session was preferrable to sampling from several ses­
sions .
The source for the data set is the Final Bill Status Re­
port: Fifty-Second Legislative Assembly published by the 
Legislative Council of the state of North Dakota. This 
document traces the fate of all bills introduced in the 
session, from introduction to rejection or gubernatorial 
signature.
This study will use two types of statistical measures in 
its analysis of the data: descriptive and inferential. Much of 
the analysis conducted in this study lends itself to simple 
descriptive measures. The first part of chapter three, the 
descriptive statistics, will use mean averages extensively as 
they describe the desired information well.
Inferential measures will be used to analyze possible 
correlations between variables and success of committee 
recommendations. Kendals tau b will be used to test for 
association for the ordinal variables. Kendalls tau shows the 
degree of association between variables and the strength and 
direction of the relationship ranging between +1 for a perfect 
positive relationship to -1 for a perfect negative relation­
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ship with 0 meaning no relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variable. A positive relationship 
will show that as the independent variable increases, the 
dependent variable will increase as well (for instance, as 
tenure of chair increases, the success of committee recommen­
dations will increase). A negative relationship shows that as 
one variable increases, the other moves in the opposite direc­
tion.
Kendall's tau also shows the confidence level for the 
association reported (r score). The confidence level will show 
with what degree of confidence the null hypothesis of no 
relationship can be rejected. A .05 r-score indicates that 
there is a 95% chance that the relationship shown by Kendall's 
Tau is not caused by chance. This .05 level is the level at 
which scholars accept the results as reliable.
The state legislative scholar Alan Rosenthal has con­
ducted much research on committee systems in states. He has 
designed as model for evaluating legislatures and their 
committee systems. The criteria Rosenthal uses in his model 
include the percent of bills over which committees have 
jurisdiction, the ability and willingness of committees to 
amend bills, the role of standing committees during the 
interim, and rate to which the parent body follows the 
recommendation of the committee.
Chapter one applied Rosenthal's model of effecitve 
committee systems to the North Dakota legislature. The results
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of the data, presented in the first part of chapter three, 
will draw further on Rosenthal's model to evaluate North Dako­
ta's legislative committee systems. Tables have been con­
structed which show the total acceptance rate of committee 
recommendations, the success of committee recommendations for 
bills upon which committee amendments were placed, and the 
success of Legislative Council bills. Further, Rosenthal 
argues that a measure of committee performance was the 
screening of bills. To study this, a table was constructed 
which shows the fate of bills which passed the house in which 
they were introduced and reach the second house. For this 
data, descriptive statistics were used as they show percentag­
es useful for comparison purposes.
Part two of the results chapter examines variables 
hypothesized to affect committee success. These can be broadly 
grouped into two broad catagories - seniority and expertise.
The measures of seniority used in this study refer to the 
chair of the committee. These are the tenure of the chair 
(total years served in the legislature) and incumbent chair or 
new chair.
The index of expertise will be made up of two char­
acteristics of committee membership - average tenure of 
members and the number of returning members. These reflect 
service on the committee, and are associated with expertise on 
the subject matter.
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Certain limitations are inherent in a study which uses 
only one legislative session. The issue of generalizability of 
conclusions is of concern; can results gleaned from only one 
session of a legislature be expanded to apply to other 
legislative sessions or other legislatures? For the inferen­
tial measures in part two of chapter three, the levels of 
significance are included which show the degree to which the 
data can be generalized. The level of confidence speaks to the 
interpretation of the data. Discussion of the levels of 
significance for the various variables is presented in chapter 
three.
For the descriptive data (part one of chapter three) the 
results can be applied with a high degree of confidence, but 
to only this legislative session. One characteristic of the 
1991 legislative session - the high number of first term 




Rosenthal has shown that extreme legislative deference to 
committee recommendation is not uncommon2. This chapter will 
present data which shows to what degree this is applicable to 
the North Dakota legislature and its committees. In addition, 
several variables have been hypothesized to affect committee 
recommendation success and they, too, will be studied. The 
variables to be examined are:
- the effect tenure of the chair on the success of recom­
mendations ,
- the effect of increased legislative tenure of committee 
members upon the success of committee recommendations,
- the effect of a returning chair and returning committee 
members on success of committee recommendations,
- the effect of amendments added in committee,
- Legislative Council bills, which reflect the work of 
interim committees,
information concerning the compostion of the Fifty-second 
Legislative Assembly such as controlling party in each 




- the success of House committee recommendations versus 
Senate committees,
- house of origin versus second house recommendations,
Descriptive statistics
A) Acceptance of Committee Recommendations
As a whole, the North Dakota legislature accepted over 93 
percent (1744 out of 1870 bills on which the committees made 
a recommendation were accepted) of its committees' recommenda­
tions in the 1991 legislative session.
Table 9
North Dakota House and Senate committee recommendations 





Number of report 
rejections**
44 82
Rejection rate 4.5% 8.8%
(Acceptance rate) (95.5%) (91.2%)
* includes bills from both houses; does not include bills for 
which "no recommendation" was the committee report.
** rejection includes instances in which either the floor 
voted against the committee recommendation or voted to reject 
the committee amendments or further amended the bill on the 
floor.
This corresponds closely with research on other states' 
committee systems, which show that recommendations are ac-
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cepted at high rates.3 This also supports earlier research 
done on North Dakota's legislature.4 Herndon's research 
examined the 1963 and 1965 legislative sessions and found 
committee recommendation acceptance rates to be between 87.5% 
and 89.3%.
B) Effect of Size of Body on Committee Acceptance Rates.
The North Dakota House consists of 106 members while the 
Senate has 53 members. It has been hypothesized that a larger 
body will be more receptive to committee recommendations than 
will a smaller body. In a smaller body such as the Senate, 
interpersonal relationships and informal circles of influence 
may replace the reliance that larger legislative bodies place 
upon committees. In a large body, there is a lesser chance for 
close relationships to develop, consequently, more emphasis is 
placed on formal processes.
To study this, the number of bills for which recommen­
dations were given was totaled and the total number of times 
the recommendations of the committee were not accepted by the 
full body (bills receiving "without recommendation" or 
"without recommendation as amended" were not included in these
3Rosenthal, Ibid.
These results are from studies of California, Oregon, 
Alabama, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin. It must 
be states that in these states, not all bills must be re- ported 
out of committee as is the case in North Dakota.
4Herndon, James F. The Role of Standing Committees in the 
North Dakota Legislative assembly, (Grand Forks, ND: Bureau 
of Governmental Affairs, 1968) p.10
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numbers since the floor could not accept or reject this 
recommendation). Within this last category are bills which 
were amended in committee but whose committee amendments were 
not accepted by the floor. Also in this category are bills 
which were amended on the floor beyond action taken in 
committee. It is felt these last two criteria are indicators 
of committee influence showing floor deference and hence 
should be included.
Table 9 shows the success rates of House and Senate 
committees' recommendations on the floor. Though both houses 
show extremely high rates of acceptance - 91.2% for the Senate 
and 95.5% for the House - the data lends support for the 
hypothesis that the House committees will have a higher 
success rate than Senate committees.
The data show only composite totals of all committees for 
the respective houses. Variance among individual committee was 
considerable and this variance will be examined later.
C) Amended Bills
Rosenthal posited that the ability and willingness of a 
committee to make its wishes known by changing (amending) 
bills is a characteristic of more powerful committee systems. 
From this it could be posited that the degree to which a 
legislative house accepts bills amended by its committees will 
show the power of committees in that legislature. The fate of
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amended bills in the 1991 North Dakota legislature is present­
ed in Table 10.
Table 10
Total bills amended in committee.
House Senate
Total bills amended 407 402
Percentage amended* 41.5 42.1
*Includes bills receiving "do pass", "do not pass", and 
"without committee recommendation" recommendations
Table 10 shows that a high proportion of bills are 
amended in committee. More than four out of ten bills reported 
out of committee reflect changes made in committee. Once an 
amended bill reached the full floor, the rate of acceptance 
tended to correspond closely with that of bills passed out of 
committee unamended. Committee recommendations on amended 
bills were accepted at a 89.4% rate while recommendations on 
all bills were accepted at a 93.5% rate. The variation between 
amended and unamended bills is slight. It appears possible the 
differences can be accounted for by subject matter of bills, 
as well as committee recommendation.
D) Screening Legislation
Rosenthal stated that one role of committees was to 
screen and shape legislation. If committees perform this role,
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bills receiving support in the house of origin should have 
many of the controversies resolved and should be ready for 
passage by the other house. A measure of the efficacy of 
committees can be obtained by looking at the number of bills 
which are amended or killed by the second house.5 To obtain 
this measurement, bills which received amendments or were 
killed by the second house were tallied. To eliminate bills 
receiving minor amendments, only bills which went to confer­
ence committees were used. The fact that a conference com­
mittee was necessary shows that the change (s) made in the 
second house committee was so substantial that the first house 
would not accept the bill as it was rewritten by the second 
house. A bill killed by the second house shows a definite 
refutation of first chamber's work. Tables 11 and 12 show the 
results of second house treatment of bills.
Tables 11 and 12 also show remarkable congruence between 
the two houses in their treatment of bills sent from the other 
house. The number of amended bills requiring adjustment by 
conference committee were equal in the two houses. The number 
of bills killed by the second house differs by only five.
Individual committees vary considerably in the number of 
bills sent over from the other house that they feel they need 
modification. At the high end of the spectrum is the House 
Appropriations committee which amended or killed 44% of the
5Control of the houses was split - GOP in the House of 
Representatives and Democrats in the Senate.
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Table 11
Second house treatment of bills - House committees and floor 
acting on Senate bills.
Total
Amended & Bill Killed Changed or Total
Conf . Comm.* (dnpXdnpa)** Killed (%) Bills
COMMITTEE
Agriculture 4 6 10(27.8) 36
Appropriations 23 9 32(44.7) 76
Education 3 2 5(18.5) 27
Finance & Taxation 2 3 5(15.6) 32
Human Services 1 3 4(11.1) 36
Industry, Business, 
and Labor
2 6 8(22.2) 36
Judiciary 2 3 5(10.2) 49
Natural Resources 1 5 6(19.4) 31
Political
Subdivisions
1 4 5(16.7) 30
State & Federal 
Government
4 3 7(17.9) 39
Transportation 1 2 8(22.2) 36
TOTALS 44(10.4) 51(12.1) 95(22.5) 422
* reflects the bills which were amended in the second house 
and whose amendments were not accepted by the first house. 
These bills required a conference committee to iron out 
differences between bill versions.
** reflects bills receiving "do not pass" or "do not pass as 
amended" recommendations from committee and were killed on the 
floor of the second house.
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Table 12
Second house treatment of bills - Senate committees and 
floor acting on House bills.
Amended & Bill Killed
Total
Changed or Total
Conf . Comm.* (dnpXdnpa)** Killed (%) Bills
COMMITTEE
Agriculture 1 2 3(15.0) 20
Appropriations 11 1 12(25.5) 47
Education 2 5 7(24.2) 24
Finance & Taxation 4 8 12(27.3) 44
Human Services 8 3 11(23.9) 46
Industry, Business, 4 3 7(14.9) 47
and Labor 
Judiciary 4 13 17(25.8) 66
Natural Resources 2 1 3(11.1) 27
Political 2 5 7 (20.6) 34
Subdivisions 
State & Federal _ 3 3(7.7) 39
Government
Transportation 6. 2 8(22.2) 36.
TOTALS 44( 10.4) 46(10.8) 90(21.2) 424
* reflects the bills which were amended in the second house 
and whose amendments were not accepted by the first house. 
These bills required a conference committee to iron out 
differences between bill versions.
** reflects bills receiving dnp or dnpa recommendations from 
committee which were killed on the floor of the second house.
bills sent over from the Senate, while the Senate State and 
Federal Government committee amended or killed only 7.7 % of 
the House bills it handled. These results could be construed
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to indicate the amount of agreement or disagreement between 
the goals of the respective committees.
The data does seem to support the hypothesis that the 
originating chamber acts effectively in screening legislation. 
The percentage of bills which are killed by the second house 
(11.5%) is considerably lower than for all bills in general 
(39.4%). Examining first house amendments acceptable to the 
other chamber, the numbers show that this function is per­
formed well also. Only 10.4% of bills received by the second 
house required substantive amendments, while 36.7% of all 
committee reports reflected some changes. In this area, too, 
there is a substantial difference between bills which have 
passed one house and all bills in general. It is interesting 
to note the number of bills (10.4% in each house) sent over 
from one house to the other which receive substantive amend­
ments in the second house. This suggests that the second house 
feels that there is some concern the first house did not 
address adequately. This is all the more intriguing in light 
of the fact that the Senators and Representatives are elected 
from the same geographic regions representing the same 
constituents. It would seem that the voters would elect Sena­
tors and Representatives of like mind. If this were the case, 
there should be little discrepancy between the desired effect 
of bills in either house, yet bills sent from one house to the 
other are marked by substantive amendments.
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E) Controversial bills
Many bills are pro forma bills - i.e. bills which renew 
biennial appropriations for state agencies and commodity 
boards and the like; bills affecting only a small minority of 
people; bills updating statutes; or bills removing politically 
incorrect language. Such politically noncontroversial bills 
may skew the results toward success of recommendations. In an 
effort to control this, an index was created to eliminate 
consensus or near consensus bills. By including bills whose 
floor vote had at least 20 % of the full body voting in the 
minority, only bills generating controversy are included. For 
the 106 member House of Representatives, at least 21 members 
must have voted against the majority and for the 53 member 
Senate, 11 must have voted in the minority (these numbers will 
change if not all members were present for the floor vote). 
Table 13 shows the results of this index.
Once again, individual committees showed a high amount of 
variance in their success rates. For example, the House Human 
Services and Veteran's Affairs committee enjoyed remarkable 
success having only 3.8% of its reports rejected. Across the 
hall, the Senate Veteran's Affairs committee suffered a 50% 




Bills on which floor vote included at least 20% voting in the 
minority. 1991 North Dakota legislative session.
House Senate
Number of Reports Number of Reports
COMMITTEE
bills rejected (%) Bills Rejected(%)
Appropriations 29 3 (10.3) 37 12 (32.4)
Education 18 3 (16.6) 17 3 (17.6)
Finance & 
Taxation
15 4 (26.6) 28 9 (32.1)
Human Services 26 2 (3.8) 14 7 (50.0)
IBL 23 5 (21.7) 17 5 (29.4)
Judiciary 18 5 (27.7) 19 4 (21.0)
Agriculture 15 3 (20.0) 8 2 (25.0)
Natural
Resources
11 2 (18.1) 11 5 (45.5)
Political
Subdivisions
20 2 (10.0) 24 10 (41.6)
State & Federal 23 
Government
5 (21.7) 14 4 (28.5)
Transportation 14 2 (14.2) 17 9 (52.9)





reports out of 418 bills meeting
Source: Bill 
Assembly
Status Book, North Dakota 52nd Legislative
Results for the full bodies show that the full floor of 
either chamber is more likely to reject committee recom­
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mendations on more hotly contested bills than for all bills. 
Committee reports for all bills in general are rejected only 
4.5% of the time in the House and 8.8% of the time in the 
Senate. This compares with the data shown in Table 13 which 
show that on more disputed bills, rejection rates climbed to 
16.9% for the House and 33.9% for the Senate.
This data suggests that when contested bills are up for 
passage before the full chamber, the committee recommendation 
weighs less heavily with the legislators than with bills which 
are not as hotly contested.
F) Legislative Council Bills
It has been shown that the full floor shows a high level 
of deference toward committee recommendations. This deference 
can is also shown for bills devised by committees working 
during the interim. Remember, Rosenthal lists among his 
dimensions of better performing committees the work of interim 
committees. As such, another dimension of committee success is 
the rate of success Legislative Council bills have in com­
parison with all other bills. Table 14 does this for the 1989 
and 1991 sessions.
For this hypothesis to be studied, an assumption must be 
made: the recommendations of interim committees (bills) have 




Legislative Council Bills 1989 Session 






House 9(13.4) 29(43.2) 38(56.7) 67
Senate 5(8.0) 31(50.0) 8(21) 62






House 12(16.7) 29(40.3) 43(59.7) 72
Senate 15(15.0) 52(52.0) 48(48.0) 100
* Passed out of committee with amendments 
** Passed out of committee as introduced
$ total number of bills for which recommendations were made 
(includes bills from both houses). This column totals more 
than 100% because some of the recommendations may have been 
rejected by the full house.
Source: Legislative Council, Final Bill Status Report: Fifty- 
first Legislative Assembly. Final Bill status Report: Fifty- 
second Legislative Assembly.
With this assumption, an argument can be made that the success 
of Legislative Council bills in receiving approval by the 
Legislative Assembly will be as high or higher as committees 
during the session. Also, since these bills were drawn up by 
interim committees, there should be little need for the 
regular session to change the bills.
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The data in Table 14 does not support the hypothesis that 
a smaller proportion of interim bills will receive amendments 
from committee than all bills in general. Table 14 shows that 
the percent of bills needing amendments to pass the full body 
in either house was high - 46.5% (60 out of 129 bills handled 
in committee) in 1989 and 47.1% (81 out of 172) in 1991.
A possible explanation for this high rate of amended 
interim committee bills may be the fact that the members of 
the interim committee are not necessarily the same legislators 
who served on the committee which handled the bill during the 
session. Differing membership may be caused by legislators not 
being re-elected, changes in standing committee membership, or 
a change in majority party or leadership.
Overall, the data show that in the 1989 session, 80.5% of 
legislative council bills passed in some form - as introduced 
or with amendments - while 64.3% (783 out of 1216) out of all 
other bills passed. The numbers for the 1991 session show 
70.9% of legislative council bills passing in some form while 
63.1% (860 out of 1361) out of all other bills passed. This 
shows that the chambers of the North Dakota state legislature 
show deference toward the interim committees by passing a 
higher percentage of Legislative Council bills than all bills 
in general. This statement should be qualified: the issues 
studied by the interim committees are issues of particular 
importance to the legislature. The topics studied by the 
interim committees were assigned to them by the Legislative
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Council, often at the request of some committee of the 
preceding legislative session. Hence, the bills introduced by 
the Legislative Council are of particular salience. This may 
contribute to the difference in acceptance rate between Legis­
lative Council bills and all other bills in general.
Inferential Statistics
A) Chairperson Characteristics
It has been hypothesized that characteristics of the 
chairperson of the committee will have an effect on the 
success of committee recommendations. In order to examine this 
statistically, two characteristics of chairpersons are 
explored - existence of a returning chair for a committee and 
tenure of the chair in the legislature. This study will 
examine to what extent the null hypothesis these variables 
have no effect on the success rate of committees can be 
rejected. The results of these data are presented in Table 15.
The results show that the effect of a long tenured chair 
on committee recommendation success is negligible.The scores 
for dimensions which measure chair characteristics (tenure of 
chair and returning chair) show that a long tenured chair has 
little relationship to the committee having a high rate of 
success in getting its recommendations accepted. There is 
little if any association between these factors and committee 
success; the -.21 r score for returning chair and
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Table 15
Kendall tau b correlation coefficients for selected dimensions 









% of committee 
members returning
-.10 .5131




* significant to .05 confidence level
.06 for tenure of chair show a weak influence and the signifi­
cance levels show that the results cannot reject the null 
hypothesis with a high degree of certainty. It is interesting 
to note that the relationship between returning chair and 
success of committee recommendation is negative while that of 
tenure of chair shows almost no relationship. These results 
suggest that there is almost no advantage in the North Dakota 
legislature to having a tenured chair or holding a chair 
position for consecutive sessions. In this respect, the 
results of this study show that the North Dakota legislature 
runs contrary to the literature and conventional wisdom 
concerning legislative power.
53
The levels of significance provide confidence that there 
is no relationship between the variables studied. Scholars 
conclude the confidence level at which the null hypothesis - 
no assocaition - can be accepted is .05. By this it is meant 
that there is a probability of .95 that the results obtained 
are not a result of chance. The significance levels for tenure 
of chair and returning chair are much greater than .05.
The r scores for the respective houses - Tables 16 and 17 
- show that a more senior chair will have a deleterious effect 
on the recommendations of the committee on the floor. This is 
particularly pronounced in the House which shows that a 
returning chair will have a -.51 relationship to committee 
acceptance rates.
Again, it is particularly interesting to note that in 
North Dakota, a returning chair - which is considered a mark 
of expertise and familiarity with the subject matter in other 
states - will have a deleterious effect on his\her committee's 
success on the floor. These are striking results as they 
suggest that there is little or no value to tenure in North 
Dakota. The data fall within the .05 cutoff point for 
accepting a hypothesis. The other results are not as striking 
nor can they be accepted at such a high confidence level.
As a whole, then, chair seniority is not a good predictor 
of a committee's success in getting its recommendations 
accepted by the full body (it is a better predictor in the 
House than in the Senate, though).
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Table 16
Kendall tau b correlation coefficients for selected dimensions 









% of committee 
members returning
. 04 .8749





Kendall tau b correlation coefficients for selected dimensions 









% of committee 
members returning
. 14 . 5748





Research by Rosenthal has shown that legislators tend to
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rank colleagues with more tenure as having greater exper­
tise.6. The results presented above show that, in North 
Dakota, this has not proven to be true with regard to the 
chair of a committee. We now apply the test of tenure equaling 
expertise hypothesis for committee members of the North Dakota 
legislature. Again, two characteristics, which are suspected 
to define committee members expertise, are examined to 
determine their effect on committee success. The variables 
are: number of returning committee members - a dimension 
associated with expertise - and the average tenure of 
committee members - another measure of experience. The null 
hypothesis is that there will be no association between these 
variables and success rates of committees.
With the perception of tenure equaling expertise, the 
hypothesis can be made that the parent chamber should show a 
high degree of respect for decisions reached in committees 
made up of a high proportion of long-serving members. There 
should be a positive correlation between higher tenure 
committees and committee recommendation acceptance rates. The 
data do not support this hypothesis. Table 15 shows that the 
average years of service of committee members for both houses 
of North Dakota's legislature does indeed have an effect on 
the success rate of committee recommendations (tau score of - 
.32). However, the sign shows us that the relationship is 
negative! This suggests that a high degree of committee
6Rosenthal, 1974, p.169
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experience not only does not enhance success of recommenda­
tions in the North Dakota legislature, but actually slightly 
diminishes the chances of getting recommendations accepted on 
the floor. This is interesting because it contradicts 
Rosenthal's research which showed legislators tended to 
associate tenure with expertise. The results for this test are 
significant at the .05 level.
Results for the individual houses, presented in Tables 16 
and 17, show that any relationship between the examined 
characteristics of committee members and success of committee 
recommendations is small and the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected with a high degree of certainty. The data show that 
a negative association exists in Senate committees for average 
years of service and success of committees. This assocaition 
is only .-33, but the fact that it is a negative value is 
interesting and goes against the research of Rosenthal as well 
as Culver and Dye. The confidence level is not within the .05 
standard. Indeed, the null hypothesis of "no relation" can be 
rejected with only a 84% degree of certainty - not high to be 
accepted by professional standards.
Summary of results
This chapter presented several hypotheses about variables 
believed to affect the success rate of committees in getting 
their recommendations accepted by the parent body. Some of 
these variables dealt with the output of committees - amended
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bills, interim committee bills, the role of committees in 
screening legislation - and others addressed possible charac­
teristics of committees and chairpersons which were thought to 
effect the success of committees. Two types of analyses were 
employed to study the effects of the variables - descriptive 
statistics for interhouse comparisons, and inferential 
statistics for chair and committee members characteristics 
thought to influence success of committees.
The data provided some unexpected results with regard to 
the two characteristics studied which are commonly equated 
with a strong chairperson. The data suggest that there is a 
negative relationship between these and success of committee. 
This pattern of unexpected results conflicts with conventional 
wisdom and scholarly research, on the importance of expertise 
in legislatures. The data from North Dakota show results which 
are opposite with other research in other states. This raises 
some interesting questions to be addressed.
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The intent of this work has been to study the North 
Dakota legislative committee system, evaluate its strengths 
and weaknesses, and attempt to identify determinants of 
committee success.
The basic hypothesis - the North Dakota Legislature would 
show considerable deference to its committee's recommendations 
when voting on bills on the floor - is supported by the data. 
Subsequent hypotheses developed examined other dimensions of 
committee strength, such as the ability and willingness of 
committees to amend bills, the work of committees during the 
interim period, the effect of size of body on committee 
success, and the efficacy of house of origin committee in 
screening legislation for the chamber. These data are 
presented in tabular form with comparisons made between houses 
and with other states where data was available.
Variables expected to effect committee success - char­
acteristics of the chair of the committee and the committee 
members - were examined to determine the amount and direction 
of association with success and the reliability with which the 
results may be accepted. The hypotheses regarding association
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were not supported by the statistics. In general, this study 
revealed a strong agreement between both houses of the North 
Dakota legislature and their committees, but was unable to 
identify specifically why the committees were so successful.
Committee report acceptance rates
The combined rate of acceptance for both houses was over 
93%. More than 93 out of 100 committee recommendations on 
bills sent to the floor were accepted by the full chamber. 
This number does not include bills accepted but amended on the 
floor, only bills for which the committee report was accepted 
as it was sent. For instance, committee recommendations on 
bills which were amended on the floor were considered rejected 
reports. This makes the acceptance rate even more formidable.
That a healthy respect for committee recommendations 
exists was the expected finding, but the overall rate of 
acceptance was surprisingly high. Other states surveyed had 
acceptance rates of between 85% (Ohio) to 92% (Oregon) putting 
North Dakota toward the high end of the spectrum.
Rosenthal's criteria for a strong committee system 
include the success of committees in getting their recommen­
dations accepted by the full body. In this respect, North 
Dakota's committee system is very strong. The reason or 
reasons for this success could serve as a research question 
for future study. Many hypotheses have been advanced for this
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deference, but it is not the goal of this study to propose new 
theories or review existing ones.
The data support the hypothesis that the larger House of 
Representatives would show more deference to its committees 
than the Senate. Although both houses show considerable 
respect for the decisions reached in committee, the House 
accepted four percent more committee reports than the Senate 
(95.5% versus 91.2%). It was hypothesized that a larger body 
will have to rely on its committees to deliberate on bills and 
become expert on them because the whole body would not have 
the time to acquire that knowledge. It is not possible to say 
with certainty that the reason for this success is the 
expertise supplied through committee, or even if size of the 
legislative body is a factor in success of committee recommen­
dations, without studying it more directly. Intervening 
variables may figure into this equation.
Committee amendments
Committees in North Dakota show a high degree of 
willingness to amend bills referred to them, and the parent 
body accepts the committee's amendments at a rate comparable 
to its acceptance of all recommendations in general. Four out 
of ten bills referred to committee emerge with some type of 
committee modification applied to them. The ability of 
committees to impose their changes on bills referred to them 
shows a dimension of committee strength. Further, the degree
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to which the full body accepts the amendments shows that the 
committees are accorded respect by the full floor. This, too, 
reflects committee strength.
The fact that committees amend a high proportion of bills 
and that these amendments are usually accepted is meaningful 
for legislators and lobbyists because it is at this stage of 
legislation where they can have the most effect (other than 
the drafting process) . The data suggests that if these actors 
are able to get the committee to agree with their goals, they 
can enjoy a reasonable expectation that the bill reported out 
of committee will reflect some of their interests. This 
suggests a research possibility: what can interested parties 
do to affect the shape of legislation, and how much influence 
can they have in committee.
It was speculated that if committees, and the first 
house, perform their roles well, there should be little need 
for the second house to reject or amend legislation after 
crossover (bills sent over to the other chamber from the house 
of origin). This was tested by looking at the total number of 
bills which were killed or amended in the second house. The 
results show that the second house killed or amended bills at 
a rate much lower than bills over which it had original 
jurisdiction. The data, then, support the hypothesis that the 
first house will act to screen legislation, weeding out bad 
legislation. Interestingly, the fact remains that 21% of bills 
sent from one house to the other are killed or amended by the
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second house. This inter-house competition is difficult to 
explain (of course, partisan control of the house will account 
for much of this discrepancy, but this only serves to 
corroborate the following argument). It was noted in Chapter 
three that Senators and Representatives in North Dakota are 
elected from the same districts and hence should represent the 
same voters. It is also reasonable to believe that these 
voters elect people with similar attitudes for the Senate and 
the House. With this in mind, explaining the relatively high 
number of bills amended in the second house is even more of an 
enigma. Perhaps Senators and Representatives have differing 
perceptions of their legislative role. In Congress, the 
Senators represent geographic areas and House members 
represent population. However, in North Dakota, Senators and 
Representatives are elected from the same districts so no 
differing constituencies exist. It would be interesting to 
study whether Senators' and Representatives' perceptions of 
their duties differ and if so, how.
The North Dakota legislature deals with many bills which 
are non-controversial and this skews the results for total 
acceptance rates. As previously noted, the legislature accepts 
93% of all committee recommendations. However, when non- 
controversial bills are eliminated from study, the rate of 
committee recommendation acceptance drops to 75%. This 
suggests that with more controversial bills, the members of 
North Dakota's legislature rely upon criteria, other than
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committee recommendation. What those are is important and 
should be examined further.
Chair effect
The data showed some unexpected results with regard to 
tenure of chair and success of committee recommendations. The 
literature has shown a correlation between tenure of chair and 
the supposed power the chair wields in the legislature. Also, 
tenure has been associated with expertise. Given these 
assumptions, the fact that North Dakota shows so little 
association between tenure of committee chair and committee 
success looms as an enigma over the results of this study.
The statistical data do not support the hypotheses about 
chair characteristics effecting the success of committees. The 
results show that the association for one of the two charac­
teristics of chairpersons studied was negative, albeit, 
slightly so. The effect of a returning chair had a negative 
relationship upon the success of committee recommendations - 
although this association could not be accepted with a very 
high confidence level. The other chair dimension studied had 
almost no relationship to committee success.
What does all this mean? It may reveal something about 
the political tradition of North Dakota. North Dakota could be 
called a "Jeffersonian" state because it places great faith in 
its citizens' ability to make wise choices. Also, the distrust 
of "professional government" is suggested by the fact that
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high tenure had an inconsequential, or even detrimental, 
effect on committee recommendations.
These beliefs are written into the constitution which 
provides for extreme division of the powers of government 
between the governmental branches. Even the power given to the 
representative branches is curbed, i.e. the referendum and 
initiative. The executive branch is shackled with even more 
restrictions on its power than the legislative. This is 
evidenced by the amalagum of elected offices which make up the 
executive branch. North Dakota has its administrative powers 
divided up into seven elected offices over which the governor 
stands as the head1.
Elwyn Robinson addressed this distrust of professional 
government in North Dakota. He spoke of how the constitution 
gave much of the power normally conceded to the legislature, 
to the people of the state2. An example of this is the fact 
that the referendum has been employed with such success by the 
state. This shows that even in a state that has a "citizen 
legislature", the populace has a marked distrust of the very 
people they elect.
^ellif, Theodore B, and Tweton, Jerome D., North Dakota: The 
Heritage of a People. (Fargo, ND: Knight Printing Co.), 1983, 
p. 109
2A good discussion of the motives of the delegates to the 
North Dakota Constitutional Convention can be found in Elwyn 
B. Robinson's History of North Dakota. (Lincoln, NE: Univer­
sity of Nebraska Press), 1966, p.212-213.
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These results highlight an issue which begs research - a 
comparison of states operating with "citizen legislatures" 
with those having "professional legislatures". There are many 
angles from which scholars could approach this question: 
comparisons of committee success, comparisons of peoples' and 
legislators' perceptions of the role, efficacy and integrity 
of government officials, comparisons of the amount of turnover 
in the statehouses, the list of possibilities goes on.
Committee members
Two characteristics of committee members (average length 
of legislative service and number of returning committee 
members) were studied to determine if any correlation existed 
between characteristics of committee members and committee 
recommendation success. Neither of these showed much correla­
tion with committee success. The correlation between a larger 
number of returning committee members and success of committee 
recommendations was found to be low and not statistically 
significant to the .05 level. Also, the relationship between 
longer average tenure of committee members and success of 
recommendations was found to be small.
It could be that this particular year was an anomaly, and 
that the variables studied do have an effect upon how 
successful committees will be in getting their recommendations 
accepted. This can not be confirmed or rejected with certi­
tude. Quite possibly, there are other variables involved that
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were not considered here. For instance, the bill assignment 
process may play a large part in determining committee 
success. If a committee gets only very controversial, high 
profile legislation which concerns many constituents, the 
individual legislators may not give the committee report as 
much weight when they make their decisions. As posited 
earlier, there may be other influencing variables in these 
cases. In instances such as these, the amendments put on in 
committee and the acceptance rate may be a more accurate 
measure of a committee's success or power. An analysis of 
committee minutes could answer the question.
Conclusion
There are inherent limitations in a study such as this: 
the data set used consisted of only one legislative session 
which makes the results less generalizable than if several 
sessions could have been examined, the results garnered from 
this particular year may not be characteristic of past and 
future legislative sessions. However, in defense of the data 
set used, the Fifty-second legislature of North Dakota was not 
necessarily abnormal. No redistricting had taken place before 
the 1990 election, thus the members represent voting patterns 
which had been established over the previous four elections.
Factors beyond the scope of this study may also con­
tribute to the success of committee recommendations. Partisan 
divisions and public positioning undoubtedly figure into the
67
equation, as will personalities. However, the extent to which 
these factors affect floor votes is difficult to quantify.
When individual chairpersons and committees are examined, 
it is probable that more than years of service figure in to 
chair selection, this may effect the assignment of bills to 
committees.
One implication from this study is that party leadership 
pay more attention to committee chair selection. It is obvious 
from the study that chairs are not positively correlated with 
a committee's success. Party organization could do well to 
examine this concern as could future research on chair 
influence on legislation. Since committees are so crucial to 
the legislative process and chairs instrumental to committees, 
this deserves more attention by parties and scholars alike. It 
may very will be central to the efficient operation of the 
North Dakota legislature.
APPENDIX
Total of all bills (Senate and House bills) handled by Senate committees 
and the recommendations given.






Appropriations 37 83 1 8 - 18(13.7) 131
Education 23 24 3 17 3 4(5.7) 70
Agriculture 24 23 1 3 1 3(5.8) 52
Natural Resources 32 22 - 7 - 2(3.3) 61
Human Services 34 40 1 1 - 7(9.2) 76
Finance & Taxation
26 31 - 29 - 10(11.6) 86
Judiciary 64 46 1 32 6 9(6.0) 149
Transportation 38 25 3 8 2 12(15.8) 74
Political
Subdivisions
36 26 3 8 5 11(14.9) 74
Industry, Business 
& Labor
44 23 5 15 5 9(9.8) 92
State and 
Federal Gov't
38 37 4 8 - 8(9.2) 87
TOTALS 396 380 22 136 20 82(9.3) 954
* dp = "do pass", dpa = " do pass as amended", dnpa = "do not pass asamended", dnp = "do not pass", wra = "without recommendation as amended", 
wr = "without recommendation".
** committee report rejected by the full body (House or Senate). 
Percentage does not include "wra" or "wr" bills since the committee took 
no stand on these bills.$ total number of bills handled in committee
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Total of all bills (Senate and House bills) handled by House committees 




















Education 27 21 2 24 - 5(6.8) 74
Agriculture 28 28 2 9 - 4(6.6) 61
Natural Resources 29 24 1 18 - 5(6.9) 72
Human Services 34 47 2 14 - 5(5.2) 97
Finance & 
Taxation
39 30 3 13 1 5(5.8) 86
Judiciary 59 59 4 12 1 1 6(4.9) 123
Transportation 34 28 2 17 1 4(4.9) 82
Political
Subdivisions




34 36 8 8 — — 5(5.5) 91
State and Federal Gov't
59 21 1 8 - 6(6.7) 75
TOTALS 403 371 32 166 4 4 44(4.5) 980
* dp = " do pas s", 







amended", dnpa = "do not pass as 
without recommendation as amended".
wr = "without recommendation".
** committee report rejected by the full body (House or Senate). 
Percentage does not include "wra" or "wr" bills since the committee took 
no stand on these bills.
$ total number of bills handled in committee
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Committee members' average years of service on North Dakota legislative 
committees - 1989 and 1991 sessions.
Committee 1989 session 1991 Session
House Senate House Senate
Appropriations 8.8 7.5 7.0 11.9
Education 5.1 6.8 4.1 8.3
Finance and 
Taxation
6.7 8.3 5.5 10.6
Industry, Business 
and Labor
8.9 10.7 4.5 12.0
Judiciary 3.8 7.4 1.4 4.3
State and Federal 
Government
3.4 7.4 2.8 6.0
Agriculture 4.9 5.3 2.9 8.6
Natural Resources 8.3 7.4 4.4 4.9
Political Subdivisions 6.5 7.1 4.4 7.5
Human Services and 
Veterans Affairs
6.5 7.4 2.7 2.0
Transportation 2.1 8.4 2.1 12.0
Source: Lawmakers of North Dakota: Legislative Session 1989 and 1991. N.D 
Motor Carriers Association.
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Tenure of Committee Chair - number of years served in legislature.
Committee 1989 Session 1991 Session
House Senate House Senate
Appropriat ions 22 12 12 14
Education 8 10 14 12
Finance and Taxation
14 6 14 12
Industry, Business, 
and Labor
8 10 6 12
Judiciary 14 6 18 4
State and Federal 
Government
16 6 18 4
Agriculture 14 12 16 6
Natural Resources 16 10 8 14
Political Subdivisions 4 10 16 4
Human Services and 
Veterans Affairs
50 4 8 4
Transportation 12 6 6 6
Source: Lawmakers of North Dakota: Legislative Session of 1989 and 1991.ND 
Motor Carriers Association.
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Bill status summary of Fifty-second Legislaitve Assembly.
House Senate Total
Total Bills Introduced 614 596 1210
Total Bills passed (by 
house of introduction)*
369 364 733
Gubernatorial Action Signed Vetoed V e t oOverridden
720 13 1
Total bills becoming law = 721
* Refers to total number of House bills or Senate bills passing both
houses.
Characteristics of legislative make-up - North Dakota Fifty-second 
Legislative Assembly.
House Senate





New Members 19 55 7 8
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bryan, Frank M. Politics in the Rural States: People, 
Parties, and Processes. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, Inc., 
1981.
Culver, John H. and Syer, John. Power and Politics in 
California. New York: MacMillian Publishing Co., 1988.
Dye, Thomas R. Politics in States and Communities. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985.
Francis, Wayne L. Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A 
Comparative Analysis. Chicago, IL.: Rand McNally and Compa­
ny, 1967.
Francis, Wayne L. " Leadership, Party Caucuses, and Commit­
tees in U.S, State Legislatures," Legislative Studies 
Quarterly X (2, May 1985) : 243 - 257.
Gray, Virginia; Jacob, Herbert; and Vines, Kenneth N., ed. 
Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis. 
Boston, MA: Little Brown and Co., 1983.
Hamm, Keith E. "U.S. State Legislative Committee Decisions: 
Similar Results in Different Settings," Legislative Studies 
Quarterly. V (February, 1980) 31 - 51.
Herndon, James F. "The Role of Standing Committees in the 
North Dakota Legislative Assembly," University of North 
Dakota: Bureau of Governmental Affairs. (Oct. 1968).
Jellif, Theodore B. and D. Jerome Tweton, North Dakota: The 
heritage of a People. Fargo, ND: Knight Printing Co., 1983.
Kweit, Mary G. and Kweit, Robert W. Concepts and Methods for 
Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1981.
Lees, John D, and Shaw, Malcolm, ed. Committees in Legisla­
tures: A Comparative Analusis. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1979.
Legislative Council of North Dakota Senate and House Rules 
and Committees. Legislative Council: Bismarck, ND. 1991.
73
Legislative Council of North Dakota. Final Bill Status 
Report: Fiftv-Second Legislative Assembly. Legislative 
Council: Bismarck, ND., 1991.
Moakley, Maureen and Rosenthal, Alan, ed. The Political Life 
of the American States. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 
1984.
North Dakota. Constitution. Art. IV.
North Dakota Moter Carriers Association. Lawmakers of North 
Dakota: Legislative Session of 1991. ND Motor Carriers 
Assoc.: Bismarck, ND, 1991.
Patton, Carl V and Sawacki, David S. Basic Methods of Policy 
Analysis and Planning. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1986.
Robinson, Elwyn B. History of North Dakota. Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1966.
Rosenthal, Alan. Legislative Performance in the States. New 
York, NY: Free Press, 1974.
Rosenthal, Alan. Legislative Life: People, Process, and 
Performance in the States. New York, NY: Harper and Row, 
1981.
The Council of State Governments. The Book of the States. 
Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments, 1986, 1987, 
1988, 1989, 1990.
Thomas, James D. and Stewart, William H. Alabama Government 
and Politics. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
1988.
Thompson, Larry D. "The Role of the State and Federal 
Committee in North Dakota's Legislative Process," University 
of North Dakota: Bureau of Governmental Affairs. (Sept.
1971) .
Uslaner, Eric M. and Weber, Ronald E. Patterns of Decision 
Making in State Legislatures. New York, NY: Praeger Publish­
ers, 1977.
74
